This article examines "consistent" conjectural variations in an oligopoly model with a homogeneous product. A conjectural variation is consistent if it is equivalent to the optimal response of the otherfirms at the equilibrium defined by that conjecture. When the number of firms is fixed, we find that competitive behavior is consistent when marginal costs are constant, but that when marginal costs are rising, the consistent conjectural variation will be between competitive and Cournot behavior. Finally, if we allow free entry and redefine consistency to account for such, then only competitive behavior will be consistent.
Introduction
* The traditional criticism of industry models using conjectural variations is that each firm's conjecture about the output response of the other firms would not be confirmed if such a firm actually altered its output level from the equilibrium. As a result, there has recently been considerable interest in oligopoly models with "consistent" conjectural variations. A conjectural variation is consistent if it is equivalent to the optimal response of the other firms at the equilibrium defined by that conjecture.' In recent published work, Laitner (1980) has examined rationality in a duopoly model with a homogeneous product, and Bresnahan (1981) has considered consistency in a duopoly model with differentiated products. Consistency can be easily described in the duopoly context. Each firm's first-order condition defines its profit-maximizing output as a reaction function on (1) the output of the other firm and (2) the conjectural variation about the other firm's response. Thus, a conjectural variation by one firm about the other firm's response is consistent if it is equivalent to the derivative of the other firm's reaction function with respect to the first firm's output at equilibrium. Bramness (1979), Ulph (1981) where -1 <6<m-1.
(2) dXj
The conjectural variation is assumed to be the same for each firm and independent of both the output of the other firms and the number of other firms. An important advantage of an industry conjectural variation over conjectural variations on individual firms is that it requires no distinction between firms which are operating and mere potential entrants. The firm's perceived rate of change of profits can now be expressed as:
In equilibrium, each firm perceives no incentive to change its output level. Because all firms are identical, we confine our attention to the symmetric equilibrium,
which defines the equilibrium industry output X(m; 6) as a function of the number of firms m and the conjectural variation 6. This conjectural variation model was introduced by Bowley (1924), and it explicitly incorporates the special cases of Cournot (1838), competitive, and collusive behavior.' If 6 = 0, the equilibrium defined by (4) is the familiar Cournot equilibrium (Nash equilibrium in quantities). If 6 = -1, each firm expects the rest of the industry to absorb exactly its output expansion by a corresponding output reduction. This means that each firm is a price-taker and the equilibrium is competitive. At the other end of the spectrum when 6 = m -1, the equilibrium is collusive in that firms behave so as to maximize joint profits, given that there are m firms. Thus, any conjectural variation between -1 and m -1 is potentially reasonable, and the goal is to narrow this range by imposing the condition that the conjectural variation must be locally equivalent to the actual response of the other firms.
To construct the consistent conjectural variation, we need to characterize what the equilibrium response of the rest of the industry would be to a change in the output of the jth firm. Consider the following equilibrium. Given Xj, the output of the jth firm, let XO be the symmetric equilibrium output for the other (m -1) firms behaving under a conjectural variation 6. The equilibrium condition is similar to (4), 
For the conjectural variation 6 to be consistent it must be equivalent to this local equilibrium response of the other firms at the overall symmetric equilibrium. Thus, since the equilibrium response is itself a function of the conjectural variation, consistent conjectural variations are the fixed points of (6): dXo (X ; g m (7) dXj A conjectural variation which satisfies condition (7) is consistent.7 It would depend upon the number of firms m, but there may be more than one consistent conjecture for any given number of firms. Figure 1 illustrates two examples of (7), one in which there is a unique consistent conjectural variation between -1 and 0, and the other in which there are two consistent conjectural variations, -1 and one which is positive. Using (6), the consistency condition (7) can be written in terms of X, 6, and m as either: Expressions (8a) and (8b) will be useful in Section 3 for examining the type of consistent behavior which can arise under differing demand and cost conditions. The conjectural variation model is a simple static representation of the potentially complex dynamics of an oligopoly, and consistency as defined by (8) is the simplest adequate static condition for rational behavior in such a model. Thus, the value of this notion of consistency in this oligopoly model rests upon the extent to which the results in Section 3 are reasonable and enlightening from a theoretical viewpoint or testable and refutable from an empirical viewpoint.8
A consistent equilibrium may be defined by combining the equilibrium condition (4) with the consistency condition (8). Such an equilibrium simultaneously determines industry output and behavior, given the number of firms. The output of each firm is such that no firm perceives an incentive to change its output based upon a conjectural variation which is a locally correct assessment of the response that would arise from the other firms. But before considering the results in Section 3 we must first outline the secondorder and stability conditions for this system.
For each firm to be at a local profit-maximum, we require d211j/dX2 < 0 when evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium: 2 -(I + 6) -P' + (I + 6)2. (XIm). P" _ C" < O. In addition, we require that the equilibrium output defined by (4) be unique and stable for given a. If industry output is below (above) the symmetric equilibrium, firms will perceive an incentive to expand (contract):
(1 + 6 + m)P' + (1 + ).X.P" -C" < 0.
(10)
The corresponding condition on the equilibrium with (m -1) firms, given Xj, requires that the denominator of expression (6) for dXI/dXj be negative. Under (10), multiple consistent equilibria arise solely because there may be more than one consistent conjectural variation. For any solution to (4) and (8) to be a consistent equilibrium, firms must also earn nonnegative profits at the equilibrium firm output X(m; 6) under the consistent conjec- Finally, we may also be interested in the stability of the conjectural variation. Stability requires that the response of the other firms is greater (less) than the conjectural variation when the conjecture is below (above) that which is consistent, i.e., dXI/dXj i 6 as 6 ? b(m). Given the equilibrium output, stability of the conjectural variation can be obtained by requiring that the derivative of (8) with respect to 6 be negative:
Joint stability of both the equilibrium output and the consistent conjectural variation would require the Jacobian of the system (4) and (8) to be negative semidefinite. Since there is little that can be said about the Jacobian, we shall not require that the consistent conjectural variation be stable. However, condition (12) can be useful in identifying consistent conjectural variations which are unstable, thereby narrowing the set of consistent equilibria to possibly one. If there are only two firms and -X P"/P ' i? 2, then the competitive conjectural variation is the only consistent one. However, it is unstable from above when -X.P"/P' > 2. If -X.P"/P' = 2 (e.g., P(X) = a.X-i), then any conjectural variation is consistent. (c) If there are more than two firms and inverse demand declines at a linear or increasing rate (P' < 0 but P" < 0), then the competitive conjectural variation is the only consistent one.
Consistent conjectural variations
Proof: (a) The consistency of 6 = -1 is obvious from the fact that (1 + 3) is a factor of (8a) when C" = 0. The instability of 6 > -1 is seen by substituting X 'PF" from (8a) into (12). This yields -P'. (m -2) which is nonnegative. (b) When m = 2, (8a) becomes (1 + 6)2. [P'(X) + X P"(X)/2], and 6 = -1 is the only consistent conjectural variation as long as the bracketed term is not identically zero; otherwise, any conjectural variation is consistent. If -X. P"/P' > 2, the bracketed term is positive, and thus the stability condition (12) is violated for 6 --1.
(c) When m 2 3 and C" = 0, the expression in (8a) must be negative for 6 > -1 when P' < 0 and P" < 0. Thus, 6 =-1 is the only consistent conjectural variation in the relevant range.
These results indicate a strong relationship between constant marginal costs and the consistency of competitive firm behavior. If the rest of the industry were behaving competitively, a unit increase in Xj would shift the demand facing the other firms P(Xj + XO) inward by one unit and would result in exactly a one-unit contraction along the horizontal supply curve implied by constant marginal costs and competitive behavior.
Proposition 1 (c) begs one to ask whether noncompetitive consistent conjectural variations can exist with constant marginal costs and inverse demand functions which decline at a decreasing rate, i.e., P' < 0 and P" > 0. In Perry (1980) consistent conjectural variations were calculated for three such parameterizations of the inverse demand function P(X). Those findings indicate that although noncompetitive consistent conjectural variations may exist, they often do not exist. And even if one existed, it would be unstable by Proposition (la). Such a case is illustrated by the response function labelled 1-1 in Figure 1 .
With constant marginal costs, the second-order conditions (9) and (10) are obviously satisfied for a competitive consistent conjectural variation. However, for the consistent equilibrium to exist, we obviously require C(0) = 0; otherwise the profitability condition ( 11) would be violated. If there were fixed costs, we would have to consider one of the unstable consistent conjectural variations to obtain a consistent equilibrium. Proposition (lb), (ic), and the examples mentioned indicate that we would not typically find such a consistent equilibrium. (8b) is negative. The requirement P' + X. P" < 0 implies that industry marginal revenue shifts downward with exogenous output increases and guarantees that the perceived marginal revenue of each firm i1kj also shifts downward with increases in Xj, that is, P' + (1 + 3).(X/m)FP" < 0 for 6 < m -1. Thus, the second bracketed term of (8b) is negative, meaning that (8b) can be satisfied only if -1 < 6 < 0. When P' = 0, each firm chooses its output to equate marginal cost to the fixed price, irrespective of what other firms do. Thus, only 6 = 0 can be consistent. (c) For (8a) and (9) to be satisfied simultaneously, it must be that (1 + () 2 C"/P'. This can be seen by substituting in either direction. Now, when C"/P' is substituted for (1 + () in the first term of (8a), the expression in (8a) becomes C" + (1 + 6)2 .(X/m)PF". This expression is negative since C" < 0 and P" < 0, and it exceeds the actual value of the left-hand side of (8a). Thus, condition (8a) could not be satisfied when (9) is required under these circumstances.
For the class of demands P(X) for which P' + X P" < 0, including all P" < 0 and some P" > 0, the consistent conjectural variation is between competitive and Cournot behavior whenever marginal costs are rising. Rising marginal costs dampen the response PERRY / 203 of the other firms away from the competitive behavior which was found to be consistent for constant marginal costs. A unit increase in the output of one firm is viewed by the other firms as an exogenous unit inward shift in demand which in turn shifts their perceived marginal revenue functions downward. As these firms contract output, their marginal costs fall, thereby reducing their incentive to contract. As a result, the overall reduction in the output of the other firms is less than unity so that -1 < 6 < 0. Figure  1 4. Free entry and the consistent conjectural variation * Propositions 1 and 2 pertain to the industry equilibrium when the number of firms is fixed. A consistent equilibrium made performance and conduct endogenous, given this industry structure. However, a consistent equilibrium only existed if firm profits were nonnegative. Thus, one way to make industry structure endogenous would be to impose the additional condition that the free entry number of firms m-is the largest number for which profit condition ( 11) is satisfied. Exit occurs if the number of firms is greater than m; whereas entry occurs if the number of firms is less than mh. Obviously, this scenario fails when demand and cost conditions are such that no consistent equilibrium exists for any number of firms. But otherwise, conditions (4), (8), and (11) would be a system defining a free entry consistent equilibrium. Although the system of conditions (4), (8), and (11) may define a reasonable free entry consistent equilibrium when the number of firms is small, the general problem with this approach is that the consistent conjectural variation defined by (7) would not be confirmed if entry or exit occurred. Thus, in this section, we define "full" consistency to take into account that shifts in the output of one firm alter the profitability of the industry and thereby affect the combined output of the other firms via changes in the number of firms as well as changes in the output per firm.
In redefining consistency to take free entry into account, we treat the number of firms m as a continuous variable. This is strictly inaccurate because entry and exit are discrete, discontinuous processes.10 However, subject to the condition that we have a viable equilibrium with two or more symmetric firms, treating m as a continuous variable is a minor travesty in light of both the convenience and insight. To compute the equilibrium response dXo/dXj of the other firms when the number of firms in the industry is determined by free entry, we must take into account the simultaneous determination of the output of other firms XO and the number of other firms (m -1) for a given output (1 + 6)2.X.P" ;
The term in braces is the second-order condition (9). Since dXo(Xj; 6)/dXj is the ratio of these two determinants, it equals minus one, i.e. only the competitive conjectural variation can be consistent when P' < 0 and condition (9) strictly negative. Recall that when the number of firms was fixed, competitive behavior could be consistent only when marginal costs were constant. Proposition 3 now proves that with free entry, consistent competitive behavior will prevail for all demand and cost functions which allow the second-order conditions on the firm to be strictly satisfied. Although this excludes cases where marginal cost is constant or declining throughout, it certainly includes the standard case in which there are initial scale economies, say from fixed " Note that no firm recognizes that it will of necessity make zero profits-only that all the others must. If firms foresaw zero profits, they would be indifferent among all output choices. Thus, this formulation preserves a nontrivial choice problem for each firm while symmetry and zero profits are imposed subsequent to the firm's choice problem.
costs, but eventual diseconomies from rising marginal costs. Moreover, this result obtains irrespective of the number of firms that actually arise in the equilibrium. It is the recognition of free entry, not the sheer number of firms, which generates competitive behavior. This is an important insight for two reasons. First, it obviates the reflex conclusion that imperfectly competitive behavior must be present when there is not a large number of firms in the industry. And second, it provides a substantive basis for the traditional presumption of competitive behavior when the number of firms is not small. There is no need to rely upon the limiting argument that competitive behavior arises because firms are trivial relative to the size of the market.
